Chapter 8
India
and China
The India
China
relationship is an ancient one
India and China have had a relationship with each other going
back a couple of millennia. India’s early relationship with the Chinese communists
after independence is instructive of the naïveté inherent in the execution of
Nehru’s foreign policy. This was exploited both by Pakistan in 1963 and by US in 1971 after Bangladesh was created. Nehru made a great show at Bandung 1955 of bringing China into the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) under India’s wing. This incensed the Chinese communists,
who saw their place in the world quite differently, as heirs to the great power
status granted to China at Yalta. India by contrast could only aspire to such status.
Zhou En Lai, who was China’s representative at Bandung, was infuriated by what they perceived to be
condescension on the part of Nehru. After Bandung, the relationship with China continued to deteriorate, growing openly
contentious over Tibet in 1959. The long-festering border disagreement between India and China erupted into a hot war in 1962 when China invaded India through the eastern range of the Himalayas.
The United States responded to India’s request with a massive airlift to put Indian
troops and U.S. materiel where they were needed in the mountain engagement. The war with
China was a blow to the foreign policy of Nehru and to
him personally, probably hastening his death. India’s relations with China remain strained to this day. This event also
revealed to the rest of the world that India was still in the early stages of developing
a world view which was consonant with her security objectives, The China India
conflict was also an opportunity to study the reactions of the rest of the
world to the conflict and the perception of major powers about India and its
position in the world in general. Teresita Schaffer, a former South Asia specialist in the State Department made a
comment in 2002 that India has for the first time started looking at the
outside world. The information that Indian policymakers have about the power
structure inside China is woefully inadequate and the Indian public is really oblivious to the
social and power structure inside China. Moreover, the Indian media has been utterly
unhelpful in shedding light on the inner workings of the Chinese elite power
structure.
It is quite clear that the US China relationship
has a long term bearing on the future of India. The China Pakistan relationship developed in
the last 40 years also has far reaching implications for the security of India. Since the mid 90’s, the US foreign policy
community has engaged in a vigorous debate over how to deal with China in the
wake of the Cold War, simply put, whether to “engage” or “contain.” This in
itself could be a suspect stance and may be a move done merely to deflect the
attention of the international community. The West has really accepted the
power of China since 1971 when they were admitted in UNSC mainly to cut India down to size after the 1971 war. There is a lot
of media attention on the reported threat perception of China but that could merely be a smoke screen. Given a
choice between China and India, US the hyperpower would like to control the Indian peninsula since it
gives the maximum benefit compared to the Chinese landmass. Beyond a
fundamental consensus that political liberalization in China would be a good thing, however, there is little
agreement about ends and means. There is not even agreement across the board
that China poses a strategic threat to the United States. Nonetheless, the relationship is widely viewed
as vital to U.S. interests. If the US were to stop focusing on the bilateral
relationship with China, which is what the Cold War paradigm tends to make US do, and look at China in the context of what is at stake for U.S. interests in Asia as a whole, the US could get different results. The resulting
implications for India would be profound.
From this vantage point, even the question of
whether China’s military modernization poses a threat to the United States is less critical. It is enough that China’s neighbors, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, the countries of Southeast Asia, Australia, India are concerned about China’s military buildup, even if they do not always
advertise the fact.
As a result, these countries always have one eye on Beijing, making them less attuned to U.S. regional and global concerns. If power is
relational, as is often asserted, this result is by definition a setback to U.S. interests in Asia. Moreover, these Asian nations have to see China not just as a potential military threat, but as
an economic threat as well. To the extent that China uses its political muscle with the West to
distort the allocation of foreign investment to China and to promote access for China to Western markets and technology, China is buying its own economic development at the
expense of other developing countries in Asia. India and China were subjugated repeatedly because of the presumed insular nature of
their societies and alleged defensive battle mentality. As the examples of the
recent history of China show, the Chinese seem to have learned their lessons. Thus they are
expanding their influence into Tibet, Pakistan, the Central Asian Republics
(CAR), Nepal, Bangladesh, Burma, South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. The
steady propagation of Indian culture and values is a must for the survival of
our society. When living in a forest full of carnivores, it is good strategy if
the Indian elephant learns to be more aggressive.
“A strong India raises the price of China’s military buildup and expansionist policies in Asia. A strong India would also send the message that democracy in a developing country is
not incompatible with rapid growth and wealth. This is a message worth sending
not just to China and other authoritarian states, but also to all the states of Asia troubled by Islamic fundamentalism. India has the unenviable distinction
of lying at the heart of the Islamic world, spanning the globe as Islam does
from North Africa through the Middle East to Southeast Asia
and the Philippines. Not only can India deliver a positive economic message, but its
success as a state composed of varying ethnic and religious groups is an
important example for others.” From the above quote the perception of the
policymakers in the US is that India is the odd
man out in Asia in between Islamic world and Chinese world.
Hence it will be engulfed either by the Islamic countries or controlled by the
Asian hegemony of Chinese state in the long run since staying power of an
artificial country is less. This perception has been exploited by the US during the cold war to isolate and weaken India by striking alliances with Pakistan and China. But some in US have argued for a role for India in Asia. Ambassador
Chester Bowles May 23, 1965 Memo spelt out a predominant role for India in Asia in
containing (then communist) China. A section of US policymakers believe it is
important to have an Asian counterpoise to China and India could be developed as one. This sits ill with
the Indian foreign policy establishment, which is wary of getting entangled in
power games in the region and feels the US should be deflected from a China-centric policy
that visualizes India as a crucial element in furthering its foreign policy goals. India would much rather have the US put its money where its mouth is, on terrorism,
so that this is consistent with US national security strategy. However, there was a
sense of mismatch between Washington’s perceived commitment to ending terrorism, and the opinion in some
sections of the State Department that China is the problem and India’s difficulties can wait. US priorities and the US perception of the order of nations in Asia will affect India’s position and influence in the world in the
coming decades after the Iraq war. Balancing China and India has been going on for a long time by the US. Key elements of US foreign policy involved “the management of the
rise of two great powers, China and India”. Quote: “We acknowledge the desire and right of
India and China to take a place on the world stage. A benign,
stable, and economically healthy addition to the world stage will be most
welcome. But we want this to be accomplished with minimum disruption to
regional stability,” is the refrain, while it is never made clear how India’s induction into the circle of great regional
powers would constitute such a disruption. In reality, the US has played a sophisticated double game with India over China. Henry Kissinger's duplicity to the press and
toward the Indians vis-à-vis the Chinese in 1971 is a good reminder. In July of
1971, while Kissinger was in India, he told Indian officials "under any
conceivable circumstance the U.S. would back India against any Chinese pressures." In that
same July meeting Kissinger said, "In any dialogue with China, we would of course not encourage her against India." However, near the end of the
India-Pakistan war, in a highly secret 12/10/1971 meeting with the Chinese Ambassador to the UN
Huang Ha, Kissingerdid exactly this, encouraging the PRC to engage
in the equivalent of military action against the Indians. China perceives itself as always acting in a defensive
manner, and tends to be somewhat "tone deaf" to contrary perceptions
of Beijing's actions by its neighbors.
Chinese Perceptions
of India
The perception of the Chinese elite and
policymakers about India is unique. They regard Indians as ‘brown sahibs’
who have pretensions akin to the major powers. They look at India as an illegitimate power, which attained
whatever stature it did, due to a fortuitous series of international
circumstances during the world war and climate of liberal goodwill. China also perceives India to be a rival great power aspirant, belligerent
and expansionist, and will likely continue to be unwilling to confer great
power status upon it. Chinese policymakers consider the power base of the
Indian elite weak and the elite are considered pretentious and not worthy to
rule.
It is instructive to review the Chinese image of India' s strategic culture. Strategic culture is
defined as the fundamental and enduring assumptions about the role of war (both
interstate and intrastate) in human affairs and the efficacy of applying force
held by political and military elite in a country. These assumptions will vary
from country to country. Also important are the perceptions prevalent among the
elite within one country regarding the nature of another country's strategic
culture. The sum total of these assumptions tends to result, for example, in a
composite image held by China of India. Borrowing from Allen Whiting definition
of the strategic cultural image is " the preconceived stereotype of the
strategic disposition of another nation, state, or people that is derived from
a selective interpretation of history, traditions, and self -image."
The Chinese elite are not of one mind on either
the nature of their own strategic culture or on the images of these cultures in
other countries. China's self -image of its own strategic culture is essentially a Confucian
one comprising a widely held and hegemonic set of assumptions although
certainly not universal. However, China's actual strategic culture is the result of
interplay between Confucian and realpolitik strands. The outcome can be called
a "Cult of Defense," whereby Chinese elite believe strongly that their
country' s strategic tradition is pacifist, non-expansionist, and purely
defensive but at the same time able to justify virtually any use of force
including offensive and preemptive strikes as defensive in nature. Chinese
perceptions of the strategic cultures of other states tend to be formed by
military strategists and thus are skewed towards a negative image as in the
case of India. Culture has long been considered a critical dimension in China's approach to strategy and warfare. While the
term "strategic culture" was not used until 1988, conventional
thinking was that China’s Confucian tradition was a key determining factor in Chinese strategic
thinking. Because of Confucianism, in this interpretation, China tends to favor harmony over conflict and defense
over offense. Other analysts, usually focusing on Sun Tzu Art of War, have stressed a Chinese predisposition for stratagem
over combat and psychological and symbolic warfare over head-to-head combat on
the battlefield.
At the very least these interpretations of
Confucius and Sun Tzu created the image of China whose use of force is cautious and
restrained. More recently, analysts have
argued that China's leaders are actually influenced by a realpolitik strand of strategic
culture. According to this interpretation, the elite has and continues to be
quite willing to use force. Both of the two major interpretations of China's
strategic tradition ( Confucius/ Sun Tzu and realpolitik) tend to assume its
strategic culture is monistic and make no attempt to link it to domestic
policy. It is a mistake to assume that a country's strategic culture can be
subsumed within a single tradition and to focus exclusively on interstate
violence. In reality China has been far more pragmatic in the conduct of
her foreign policy than has been India and the Chinese have been predisposed to the use
of force much more so than most other nations. Indeed, it is likely that there
are multiple strands of strategic culture. And ignoring trends in intrastate
and societal violence risks overlooking diverse and important values and
beliefs about the use of force and violence.
Most Chinese strategic thinkers believe that
Chinese strategic culture is pacifistic, defensive-minded, and
non-expansionist. However, at least in the contemporary era, these sincerely
held beliefs are essentially negated, or twisted, by its assumptions that any
war China fights is just and any military action is
defensive, even when it is offensive in nature. Two further assumptions
reinforce this: that threats to China' s national security are very real and domestic
threats are as dangerous as foreign threats, and that national unification is a
traditional Chinese core strategic cultural value. The combined effect of these
beliefs and assumptions is paradoxical while most of China's leaders, analysts, and researchers believe
profoundly that the legacy of Chinese civilization is fundamentally pacifist,
they are nevertheless predisposed to deploy force when confronting crises.
Threat Perceptions. China's political and military leaders see threats
everywhere. The full extent of the siege mentality of China's leaders is not always appreciated. This
paranoia results in an elite viewing the foreign as well as domestic
environments as treacherous landscapes filled with threats and conspiracies.
The current campaign against corruption in China and the crackdown on the Falungong Sect suggest
the depth of the regime’s fear of domestic threats. This mindset may explain
the need of the Chinese authorities during the Maoist era to come up with the
seemingly innocuous phrase "China has friends all over the world." By the
same token, one would expect that China also had at least some enemies in the world.
Indeed one is tempted to conclude that the slogan itself was prompted by Chinese
insecurities. If a country indeed has many friendly states around the world,
why is it necessary to recite this ad nauseum? And the reality was that in the
late Maoist era China actually had few staunch friends: the handful that come to mind are Albania, North Korea, and (most significant for India) Pakistan. The fact of the matter is that Maoist China
believed itself to be surrounded by enemies. This was true of Deng's China, and also holds true for Jiang ZeMin' s China.
India, in the view of many Chinese analysts, is one of
the world's four great civilizations. Possessing one of the world's largest
conventional militaries, New Delhi also has a small but growing arsenal of nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles. Once a glorious empire, India now seeks to reclaim its rightful place in Asia and the world after being exploited by imperialism for hundreds of years
and then being held back by wrongheaded economic policies for decades. At the
dawn of a new century the economy has been unleashed and its citizens are eager
to achieve their country's full potential. India also represents a looming strategic threat to China, albeit not one that provokes the high level of
concern that the United States or Japan does. India is, in the words of John Garver,
a "mid-level [priority] ranking" for China. China sees
itself as the rightful preeminent power in Asia and India as its
major medium-to long-term competitor for this position. India's long-term goal, according to a strategist at
the National Defense University in Beijing interviewed in a November 2000 Guangming Ribao article, is to become a
world power. According to this analyst, the goal may constitute an overreaching of India's ambitions but it still remains cause for
Chinese concern. Of course there are less extreme views of India, but few if any of China' s strategic thinkers seem to hold warm or
positive views of India for China's future. Moreover, Chinese analysts tend to hold realpolitik views of
the world and view China's neighbors with wariness if not outright
suspicion as the above articulation of China's own strategic culture indicates.
First of all, in Beijing's eyes New Delhi is extremely ambitious. India, Chinese analysts frequently insist, has “daguomeng.". Literally this means "big country
dreams" or in the lexicon of international relations "great power
aspirations." According to one article appearing in a prominent official
weekly primarily for foreign consumption, India had taken advantage of the "power
vacuum" in South
Asia since the end of
the Cold War, and New Delhi's dream "which had been held in check for many years, began to
manifest itself ."
China believes India wants to be the hegemon of South Asia and eventually a world power. Toward this end India aspires to become a permanent member of the
United Nations ( U. N.) Security Council, and to further develop its
"comprehensive national power." China is distinctly unenthusiastic about India raising its stature in the U. N. For India, this entails a more technologically
sophisticated military with even greater power projection capability. According
to one writer, India's army is "extremely strong, " its navy ranks tenth in the
world, its air force ranks twelfth, and its defense budget continues to grow.
Chinese analysts note that India is buying hundreds of tanks from Russia, preparing to jointly produce Sukhoi fighters,
indigenously build submarines capable of launching missiles, and build
ballistic missiles capable of reaching "most targets in China." India also is expanding its nuclear arsenal. According
to one estimate, between 1986 and 2000 India was the world's largest importer of weaponry,
taking in an estimated US$ 18 billion. All of this leads a writer in the Beijing Review to ask: "Why is India
expanding its military strength in such an urgent way?" In addition to significant military power, India also is an economic power with tremendous growth
potential. Although publicly Chinese analyses tend to stress the weaknesses of India, notably the abject poverty and significant
ethnic and religious cleavages, they also recognize India' s considerable strengths. It possesses a large
population, and a bright, well-educated, cosmopolitan elite. Moreover, its
sizeable and growing high-technology sector is the envy of China. The concluding sentence of the entry on
"Indian Military Thought" in the 1997 military encyclopedia compiled
by the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences states: "At the turn of the
century, at the same time that India strives to attain its goal of becoming a
major economic power, it is working all-out on military modernization in order
to achieve its goal of becoming a powerful country….". All this, of
course, leads Chinese analysts to the inevitable conclusion that India is China' s natural rival on the Asian mainland.
Naturally, remarks such as those by India' s Defense Minister George Fernandes in early
May 1998
that China is India' s "potential threat number one" got
considerable attention in Beijing. The phrase was translated by at least one PLA analyst as simply
"number one enemy" (touhao
diren). Another version
omits the prefix "potential" and quotes
Jawaharlal Nehru as saying "The conflict between India and China is fundamental whether or not it is expressed in
war." Furthermore, the U. S.-India rapprochement that occurred in the
1990s had a military component that reinforced China' s suspicions about New Delhi' s intentions vis-à-vis Beijing. The visits to India of President Clinton in
2000 and Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff General Hugh Shelton in 2001 merely
heightened the concern.
Second, in the minds of many Chinese strategists,
India possesses an extremely belligerent strategic
culture. According to one PLA analyst: "India has resorted to arms against neighboring
countries more than 10 times" since 1947. The Chinese observe that India has fought three wars with Pakistan in 1947, 1965,and 1971. This is not to mention
the border war India fought with China in 1962 in which New Delhi is seen as the aggressor. Moreover, India has used strong-arm tactics to intimidate its Lilliputian
neighbors into following India's desires. Beijing perceives a record of
"war adventures" by New Delhi: intervention in the 1971 Pakistani
civil war, which led to the creation of the independent state of Bangladesh
(formerly East Pakistan) ; and military intervention during the 1980s in the
Maldive Islands as well as the extended military presence in Sri Lanka
(although at the invitation of the Colombo government) .Perhaps the most recent
manifestations of this belligerency, in China' s eyes, were the nuclear tests
of May 1998 and accompanying "China threat" rhetoric of Indian
officials.
Whatever the perceptions of India among the Chinese elite, the fact remains that
the gap between China and India in military prowess and technology capability has grown appreciably over
the decades since 1971. It is
inconceivable that any sober appraisal of the relative military capabilities of
the 2 nations should result in undue alarm in Beijing.
Third, India' s strategic culture is seen as expansionist
dating from Jawaharlal Nehru' s desire to create a" Greater Indian
empire" according to several analyses. Not only has a recent Beijing Review story noted this desire,
but the Jiefangjun Bao has similarly
claimed that, "since independence, India has pursued a military expansionist line."
The term "hegemonism" has also been used by China to label India' s efforts in South Asia. Widely used in the 1960s and 1970s, the word
reappeared briefly in 1998 in the wake of the May nuclear tests. For example, a
commentary in the May 19, 1998 Jief
angjun Bao was titled: "The Ambition of Seeking Hegemony is completely
exposed." China seems to have concluded that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government
desires all of Kashmir and has made this a priority. Some analysts
believe the BJP dreams of absorbing Bangladesh and Pakistan into a "greater India." In addition, India gobbled up the former Portuguese colony of Goa and annexed the independent kingdom of Sikkim in the mid-1970s. One analysis by two PLA Air
Force colonels likened India' s 1975 absorption of the Himalayan kingdom to Iraq' s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Of course territorial disputes along the
sino-indian border underscore New Delhi's expansionist ambitions in Beijing' s eyes. According to one strategist, from the
date of India's official recognition of the People' s Republic of China (December 30, 1949), it "began to quietly
nibble away at the Chinese territory along the Sino-Indian border." During
the 1980s and 1990s, according to the Chinese military encyclopedia, Indian
strategic thought became more ambitious and shifted from a continental focus
toward the Indian Ocean. China has also noted India's increasing strategic interest in Southeast Asia, especially in the South China Sea.
An article in Beijing
Review was confident that India’s military and great power ambitions would come
to naught. It is "reality of [India’s] messy
internal situation eventually will force it to wake up." According to
another Renmin Ribao article, South Asia is a region full of complex ethnic and religious
contradictions. If the United States became too deeply involved there, "it is
bound to run the risk of [being] dragged into the subcontinental mire,
including the Kashmir conflict, the thorniest problem there. And the
experience of history shows that this is an unending situation that no one is
able to break and resolve." China’s rapidly growing economic lead over India is another area, which gives the Chinese
confidence. This has been achieved solely due to the engagement of China with the west after 1978 and linking itself to
the global trade at the exclusion of India as part of the cold war. Excluding India from
the world trade is a deliberate policy of the US
policymakers. In 1980, India’s GNP
was 133 percent the size of China’s. By
1996 the two countries had traded places; India’s
economy had fallen to only 68 percent of China’s—a
dramatic change of relative position. In terms of net inflow of foreign direct
investment (FDI), India’s
intake of $72 million dollars in 1982 was only 16.7 percent of China’s
intake in that year. By 1995, however, China’s lead
was even greater: India’s FDI
for that year was only 6 percent of China’s. For
the entire period between 1982 and 1999, India’s total
FDI was, according to World Bank statistics, 5.4 percent of China’s. In
terms of foreign reserves (a good measure of a state’s ability to act
internationally), India’s
reserves of $8.32 billion were 187 percent of China’s in
1978. By 1995, India’s
comparative reserves had fallen to 28 percent of China’s.
What we see is that as part of the cold war
strategy US created its own sphere of influence for economy and geo-political
coordination. It made sure that China was integrated with the western economy starting
from 1978 and Pakistan was given enough resources to keep a healthy economy throughout 70s and
80s. By the early 90s we see that India has lagged behind substantially behind China and other east Asian countries with a strong
Chinese economy threatening to engulf India and isolate it in Asia and to reduce India’s influence from the rest of the world. This was
the real preparation before the final disintegration of India as planned internally by the sole superpower.
The relative influence of China and Pakistan with respect to India was altered significantly in the last 25 years
such that India’s influence and voice in the world as one billion people was lower than
when India started at independence in 1947. China's choices regarding Pakistan between 1969 and 1991 had everything to do with
their struggle with the Soviets. The relationship of the US, USSR and PRC to India and Pakistan was crystallized by one momentous event, the
Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969. In fact it was those clashes that prompted
the Soviets to end their policy of balance adopted in 1964 after the fall of
Khruschev, and seek a strategic relationship with India. For the Chinese the USSR was their most dangerous enemy, and the feeling
was reciprocated. Brezhnev actually declared the PRC the main adversary in
1977. 1978 was the 'year of fear' for the PRC as they found themselves
encircled by the Soviets. - Saur Revolution in
Afghanistan and the dispatch of Soviet advisors and arms - Soviet-Vietnamese
defense treaty with a major inflow of weapons and advisors Vietnam's invasion
of Kampuchea 1979 became the 'year of action' as Deng approved
- the invasion of Vietnam
- the dispatch of PLA guerilla warfare
instructors to Pakistan to train Afghans
- additional conventional military aid to Pakistan
- the intensification of assistance to Pakistan's nuclear program
The original intent behind their proliferation
was to challenge the Soviets in Afghanistan and Central Asia.
This seems to have been months prior to the actual Soviet invasion, when Pakistan had virtually no other allies. It was out of the
Commonwealth, had withdrawn from CENTO, and was under sanctions from the Carter
administration for its refusal to end the work at Kahuta. By 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed the Chinese had already sold M-11s,
and transferred nuclear technology. After that looking at the internal disorder
inside India; China started the naval expansion into Indian Ocean and started cultivating other neighbors of India. Their support to Pakistan on Kashmir was going
though flip flop but their military, nuclear and missile support to Pakistan never changed course even after the 1998 nuclear
test by India. Beijing officials regard India as a lesser power on the other side of the Himalayas and focus most of their attention on the United States, Japan, and Europe, but they
have taken note of these developments, coupled with the nuclear tests. India's support for President George Bush's missile
defense plan, which China vehemently opposes, also irked the Communist
leadership.
Two systems, one grand rivalry
One analysis in the west looks at India as suffering from inferiority complex. Beyond
the security field, Indians suffer from a national inferiority complex when it
comes to China. It is not hard to see why. In 1980, living standards and other social
and economic indicators in the two countries were roughly the same. But by
2001, China, fuelled by 22 years of dynamic economic
reforms, had overtaken India in almost all major development indicators.
Economic reforms in India began only in the early 1990s and have moved
forward fitfully, beset by political and bureaucratic inertia. India's performance is no match for its rival's.
According to UNESCO and the World Bank, 18.8 percent of Chinese were living on
less than $1 a day in 2001, compared with 44.2 percent of Indians. Although
poverty figures in India and growth figures in China are disputed, the contrast is clear. India's GDP growth and especially foreign direct
investment are nowhere near China's. India has also fallen behind in other important areas.
The personal computer penetration in China, for instance, was 15.9 per 1,000 people in
2001, compared to India's 4.5.
Foreign cellular companies have found China far easier to navigate than India. India's 6 million mobile phone population is tiny
compared to China's 150 million. At the same time, the size of India's population continues to grow and, if present
trends continue, will overtake China's by 2050. But India’s influence does not match the one from China at the same population strength. This has been
noticed by the western strategic community and the western powers and China have made sure that they keep the overall
influence of India below potential.
China's special relationship with
Pakistan
Pakistan was one of the first countries to establish
diplomatic ties with China in 1951, but it was in 1961, when it voted at
the UN General Assembly for the motion to restore China's legal status in the United Nations, that
relations between the two countries took off. Clandestine nuclear Chinese
assistance to Pakistan has been a major concern for Indian authorities. According to various
news and intelligence reports, China supplied Pakistan with weapons-grade uranium and the
nuclear-capable M-11 missiles. Indian leaders no doubt hope that further
progress in India-China relations will act as a brake on the transfer of
weapons to Pakistan. Analysts expect China's strong support for Pakistan to continue, albeit more discreetly. No major
transfer of weapon systems or related technologies, conventional or nuclear,
has been reported in the media since 2000. China still sees Pakistan as an important ally to keep India off balance. China's opposition to Pakistan's incursions into Indian controlled Kashmir in the summer of 1999 show that there are limits
to its support for Pakistan. China has a strong interest in Pakistan's internal stability, however. They see the
Musharraf government as the best bet to prevent Pakistan-based Islamist
terrorist groups from becoming active in Xinjiang.
The cold war coordination between US, China and Pakistan against India still continues but in a low profile. China continues to covertly support Pakistan for military and trade areas but at the same
time professes increasing understanding with India. US has effectively taken the role of the master
for Pakistan after 9/11 and China and US have coordinated to create a illusion
of confrontation between them starting from the spy plane incident in march
2001. A "soft" balance of power between India, China and USA may exist. Vajpayee's accomplishments in China suggest that India and China are headed toward greater pragmatic cooperation,
but not toward any broader alignment on foreign policy or national strategy.
This is good news for regional peace and stability. The strong relations that both countries have with the United States, interestingly, are likely to reinforce this
process. The result should ideally be a kind of "soft" balance of
power between the three countries, where each country will try to protect its
own interests by aligning with each country individually on an issue-by-issue
basis.
Keeping the
Americans Out
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to elbow the Americans out. It
wants American companies to invest and locate and manufacture in China. But the licenses, permissions, rules, and terms
it imposes are designed to deeply involve and thereby train local engineers and
managers and to require technology sharing so as to hasten the day when China
can say good-bye to the foreign presence and largely go it alone.
Strategically, China’s military capabilities and activities reveal an intention to turn the
waters between mainland Asia and maritime Asia (the Korean peninsula, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia) into Chinese-dominated seas. The PRC claims as
a matter of law that its national border runs in a great bulbous line to the
southeast, just a few miles off the coasts of Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Chinese naval practices already have done much
to incorporate the Taiwan Strait and, should Taiwan become part of the PRC, the
aim of taking the farthest western Pacific waters would be virtually achieved.
A recipe for confrontation with the United States now exists: what China regards as its domestic territory the rest of
the world regards as international high seas and airspace. The United States
Navy, as the EP-3 incident of June 2001 revealed, will be on the leading edge
of this confrontation. And the danger increases as the Beijing regime’s
propagandizing is strengthening the perception of its own people that defending
China’s territorial integrity (as the Chinese define it) is the test of the
leadership’s legitimacy.
Politically, the most successful method for
keeping the Americans out has been a theory promulgated by American
administration officials and academic analysts themselves: that China’s economic prosperity will inevitably bring
democracy and human rights in its wake. So China has fended off the United
States as it continues to deny religious freedom to the Falun Gong or proceeds
with its long-established ritual of acquiring a stockpile of arrested
dissidents or "spies" from which to release a few whenever a high
American official is about to visit.